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UNITED HAULERS ASSOCIATION v. 
ONEIDA-HERKIMER SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
JOSHUA J. FABER* 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision in United Haulers 
Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,1 
upheld two counties’ flow control ordinances that require trash 
haulers to deliver waste to government-owned processing facilities.2 
The Court determined that the Commerce Clause3 is not violated by 
laws that favor state or local government entities but treat all private 
entities equally.4 
This case is a natural consequence of the Court’s decision in C & 
A Carbone v. Clarkstown.5 In Carbone, the Court struck down a city’s 
flow control ordinance as violating the dormant Commerce Clause 
because it compelled trash haulers to use a specific private processing 
facility. In Carbone, a local private contractor agreed to build a waste 
processing facility at no cost to the town in return for five years of 
guaranteed minimum waste flow (120,000 tons per year) through the 
facility and the ability to charge above-market tipping fees6 for 
processing the trash.7 To ensure that the newly-created facility would 
receive the minimum waste required by the agreement, the town 
enacted a flow-control ordinance, requiring any trash within the town 
to be processed at this facility.8 After five years of operating the 
 
 *  2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United Haulers), 
127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 1790. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 4. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790. 
 5. C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 6. Tipping fees are charges to haulers when depositing waste at processing facilities. 
United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791 n.1. 
 7. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387 (1994). 
 8. Id. 
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facility, the private contractor would sell the facility to the town for 
one dollar.9 
United Haulers presented a very similar situation, except for one 
significant difference. In 1990, two New York counties enacted 
municipal ordinances requiring that all solid waste and recyclable 
materials generated within the counties be processed at one of several 
waste processing facilities, each of which was owned by the Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, a municipal public-
benefit corporation.10 The municipal corporation, like the private 
contractor in Carbone, charged a higher-than-market tipping fee to 
process this waste than did local privately-held waste processing 
facilities.11 The Court stated that the only “salient difference” between 
this case and Carbone was that the law required trash haulers to bring 
their trash to a state-owned facility, instead of a privately-owned 
facility.12 The Second Circuit held that even if the counties’ ordinances 
burdened interstate commerce, the burden was not “clearly excessive” 
in relation to the local benefits generated.13 Therefore, the ordinances 
did not violate the Commerce Clause. In a case with similar facts, the 
Sixth Circuit took a contrary position and held that a flow control 
ordinance that favored a local government entity violated the 
Commerce Clause.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this 
case to resolve the circuit split. 
The Court held that the municipal flow control ordinances 
enacted by Oneida and Herkimer Counties did not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states from enacting 
legislation that would impinge on interstate commerce, 
notwithstanding congressional inaction.15 The majority opinion 
distinguished this case, which involved a publicly-owned facility, from 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United Haulers 
II), 438 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 11. The petitioners submitted evidence that the market price for disposing of the trash 
would be between $37–$55 per ton, whereas the state entity was charging $86. United Haulers, 
127 S. Ct. at 1792. 
 12. Id. at 1790. 
 13. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d at 160. 
 14. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he Ordinance was facially discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Ordinance, in 
practical terms, is no different than other local laws struck down by the Supreme Court and this 
Court as unconstitutional.”). 
 15. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790, 1797. 
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Carbone, which involved a private entity. The Court examined the text 
of its Carbone opinion and held that Carbone did not extend the 
dormant Commerce Clause to state-owned facilities.16 
The Court stated that flow control ordinances that benefit a 
“clearly public facility” while treating all private facilities equally “do 
not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.”17 Because local governments have the 
responsibility to protect the “health, safety, and welfare of [their] 
citizens,”18 laws favoring such government entities should be judged 
differently than laws favoring local private entities, which are often 
enacted out of “simple economic protectionism.”19 
The majority provided two additional reasons why the flow 
control ordinances did not violate the Commerce Clause. First, the 
majority considered waste disposal historically to be a local 
government function.20 Because disposing of waste is a local function, 
the Court should be wary of using its Commerce Clause authority to 
interfere with local government efforts. Additionally, the ordinances 
are likely to lead to higher tipping fees only for those individuals who 
voted in favor of the laws.21 Because the burden is not being shifted to 
others who did not have the power to vote for or against the 
legislation, the majority opinion insists that the Court should be 
reluctant to invalidate a local government decision.22 
Lastly, a plurality23 analyzed the local laws under the Pike test.24 
The Court found that the ordinances imposed little, if any, burden on 
interstate commerce, which is easily overcome by the public interest 
satisfied by the laws. The ordinances provide financing for the 
 
 16. See id. at 1789 (“If the Court were extending this line of local processing cases to cover 
discrimination in favor of local government, one would expect it to have said so . . . Carbone 
cannot be regarded as having decided the public-private question.”). 
 17. Id. at 1795. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1796. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1797. 
 22. See id. at 1789 (“There is no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they 
could not obtain through the political process.”). 
 23. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer comprised the 
plurality. 
 24. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
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counties, and they additionally offer health and environmental 
benefits. The majority contended that these ordinances were passed 
under the state’s police power, and the Court—analogizing to 
Lochner v. New York25—should not “rigorously scrutinize economic 
legislation passed under the auspices of the police power.”26 
Justice Scalia concurred in part with the Court’s decision. He 
rejected the expansion of the dormant Commerce Clause and was 
only willing to give stare decisis effect to the dormant Commerce 
Clause in two situations: “(1) against a state law that facially 
discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law 
that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held 
unconstitutional by the Court.”27 Because private and public entities 
are not “similarly situated for Commerce Clause purposes”, unequal 
treatment does not equate to discrimination.28 Lastly, Scalia rejected 
the plurality opinion’s Pike balancing because he believed Congress, 
rather than the Court, should engage in balancing under the 
Commerce Clause. 
Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment, believed that 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is incompatible with the 
Constitution and should be overruled. Although he joined the Court’s 
Carbone decision, he rejected this decision, writing “[t]he negative 
Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved 
unworkable in practice.”29 Under his view, the Constitution vests in 
Congress the right to choose between the free market and economic 
protectionism, and the Court cannot invalidate a state’s power to 
regulate commerce without prior congressional action. Thomas 
viewed the majority’s distinction between a law favoring the 
government and a law favoring an in-state business as “razor thin” 
and without basis.30 Lastly, he analogized the majority’s decision to 
Lochner, but he insisted that Lochner’s “right of free contract” was as 
dubious and unwarranted as the negative Commerce Clause, which 
the Court refused to overrule as a doctrine.31 
 
 25. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 26. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798. 
 27. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
 28. Id. at 1799. 
 29. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 30. Id. at 1801–02. 
 31. See id. at 1802–03 (“[T]oday’s decision does not repudiate that doctrinal error [the 
dormant Commerce Clause]. Rather, it further propagates the error by narrowing the negative 
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Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with which Justices 
Stevens and Kennedy joined, insisting that Carbone was 
indistinguishable from this case. The dissent believed that the 
counties’ flow control ordinances discriminated against interstate 
commerce and thus could only be sustainable if they “serve[] a 
legitimate local purpose that could not be served as well by 
nondiscriminatory means.”32 
The dissent disputed the majority opinion’s conclusion that the 
waste-processing facility in Carbone was indeed private. In Carbone, 
the Court repeatedly referred to the facility as the “town’s” transfer 
station, and the town enacted ordinances to guarantee the facility a 
minimum income stream.33 In addition, the town purchased the 
facility five years after operations commenced for one dollar. In 
considering form over substance, the dissent insisted that the Court 
understood the facility in Carbone to be a municipal facility, and thus 
Carbone presents the same facts as the current case.34 
Even if Carbone did not deal with a municipal facility, the dissent 
maintained that strict scrutiny should apply regardless of whether 
legislation discriminates in favor of a privately-owned or state-owned 
facility.35 The market-participant doctrine allows states to discriminate 
if they are acting solely as market participants rather than as market 
regulators.36 Because the state is regulating the market by requiring all 
trash to be processed in specific facilities, the dissent contended it 
should not be allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce.37 
Alito then attacked the majority’s justifications for its ultimate 
decision. First, he insisted that “[d]iscrimination in favor of an in-state 
government facility serves ‘local economic interests.’”38 He cited 
 
Commerce Clause for policy reasons—reasons that later majorities of this Court may find to be 
entirely illegitimate.”). 
 32. Id. at 1803 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 1804–05. 
 34. See id. (“The Court exalts form over substance in adopting a test that turns on this 
technical distinction, particularly since . . . the transaction in Carbone could have been 
restructured to provide for the passage of title at the beginning, rather than the end, of the 5-
year period.”). 
 35. See id. at 1805–06 (“The Court has long subjected discriminatory legislation to strict 
scrutiny, and has never, until today, recognized an exception for discrimination in favor of a 
state-owned entity.”). 
 36. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984). 
 37. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1806–07 . 
 38. Id. at 1807 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 404). 
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several examples of local economic interests served by the ordinances, 
including the economic benefits to local residents employed by the 
facility as well as the local businesses supplying the facility.39 The 
dissent contended that the law should be subject to strict scrutiny if 
the legislative means are discriminatory, irrespective of the legitimacy 
of the goals. Because the goals could be achieved by 
nondiscriminatory means, the ordinances would fail strict scrutiny. 
Second, Alito insisted that “the Court is simply mistaken in 
concluding that waste disposal is ‘typically’ a local government 
function,” and cited statistics demonstrating that “most of the garbage 
produced in this country is still managed by the private sector.”40 
This decision ensures that the Court will continue to adhere to its 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and jurisprudence. Seven 
justices41 agree that the dormant Commerce Clause applied to this 
case, although they disagreed whether the Carbone precedent 
dictated the decision. Though its composition has changed in recent 
years, a strong majority of the Court maintains that the dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting legislation that 
discriminates against interstate commerce, even in the absence of 
congressional legislation. 
This decision does not definitively address the dissent’s 
public/private concerns, which must be resolved in future Court 
decisions. The majority opinion regards the Carbone decision as 
controlling for legislation favoring a private facility, whereas the 
United Haulers decision controls for legislation favoring a public 
facility. Litigation will likely arise in the future in situations that do 
not obviously fit into either category, such as if a town that owns the 
facility leases it to a private entity, and subsequently passes a flow 
control ordinance. Until such a case arises, the Court’s decisions in 
Carbone and United Haulers provide municipalities with ample 
guidance to determine whether legislation will discriminate against 
interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
 39. Id. at 1807–08. 
 40. Id. at 1811. 
 41. The only two judges who wish to invalidate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
either in whole or in part, are Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 1798–1803. 
